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Abstract  
The modern phenomenon of cybercrime raises issues and challenges on a scale that has few prece-
dents. A particular central concern is that of establishing clarity about the conceptualization of cyber-
crime and its growing economic cost to society. A further related concern is focused on developing 
appropriate legal and policy responses in a context where crime transcends national jurisdictions and 
physical boundaries. Both are predicated on a better understanding of cybercrime. Efforts at defining 
and classifying cybercrime by the use of taxonomies to date have largely been descriptive with result-
ing ambiguities. This paper contributes a semi-formal approach to the development of a taxonomy for 
cybercrime and offers the conceptual language and accompanying constraints with which to describe 
cybercrime examples. The approach uses the ontology development platform, Protégé and the Unified 
Modeling Language (UML) to present an initial taxonomy for cybercrime that goes beyond the de-
scriptive accounts previously offered. The taxonomy is illustrated with examples of cybercrimes both 
documented in the Protégé toolset and also using UML.  
Keywords: Cybercrime, Taxonomy, Ontology, Conceptual Model, Protégé. 
 
1 Introduction 
The scale of challenges and issues raised by the phenomenon of cybercrime has few precedents in 
modern society. A particular central concern is that of establishing clarity about the conceptualization 
of cybercrime and its growing economic cost to society. A further related concern is focused on devel-
oping appropriate legal and policy responses in a context where crime transcends national jurisdictions 
and physical boundaries. Both are predicated on a better understanding of cybercrime.  
In the UK, the estimated cost of £27 billion per year proposed by Detica (2011) has been questioned 
due to its lack of rigour and transparency despite the recognition that ‘modeling cybercrime is a com-
plex and difficult exercise’ (Detica 2011:3). More nuanced efforts such as that by Anderson et al 
(2012) are also perceived to have limitations due to reliability on case studies (McGuire & Dowling, 
2013).   
One possible factor leading to the difficulties of estimation is the lack of well-formed definitions and 
classification schemes able to account for the range of cybercrimes. Consequently, this area continues 
to be a recipient of significant research effort that aims to resolve the ambiguity and degree of contex-
tual mutability around notions of cybercrime (Fafinski et al, 2010, Donalds & Osei-Bryson, 2014).  
This paper aims to address the lack of well-formed definitions by contributing a semi-formal model 
that is able to classify cybercrimes within a taxonomy that has an ontological foundation. Given the 
dynamic nature of technology, the proposed taxonomy is developed both as a conceptual model and as 
an ontology that can be extended both in terms of new concepts and new types of cybercrime. The on-
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tology benefits from the use of standard tools and methods to develop ontologies and will become 
publicly available. This then, is an initial step towards a reference model for cybercrime. The research 
presented builds on a preliminary model produced as part of the CYBEROAD project for the EU Sev-
enth Framework Programme (CyberRoad, 2015). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the background to cyber-
crime. Component elements of cybercrime are discussed, together with challenges associated with de-
fining cybercrime. Existing efforts at classifying cybercrimes are reviewed. Section 3 provides intro-
ductory material on the underlying technological foundations we use for developing our proposed tax-
onomy. Core technologies such as the Unified Modelling Language (UML), Ontology Web Language 
(OWL) and the widely used ontology development platform, Protégé from Stanford University (Proté-
gé, 2015) are described. Section 4, outlines the key stages of our approach to developing the taxono-
my. In particular the relationship between conceptual models produced in UML and Ontologies is de-
lineated. The method is differentiated from other recent efforts to define approaches to developing 
taxonomies for cybercrime. In particular, we demonstrate difference to efforts by Nickerson et al. 
(2013) and Land et al. (2015).  Section 5 presents the main contribution of our work in the form of a 
taxonomy for cybercrime that has capability for both extension with new concepts and classifying new 
cybercrimes. The taxonomy is presented as a UML conceptual model and as a Protégé ontology. We 
recognize that our taxonomy is a case of emergent theory building in the sense of Doty & Glick (1994) 
and so we present an initial evaluation using two case study scenarios in Section 6. Finally, in section 
7, we present concluding remarks and further research plans for extending the ontology as a reference 
model for cybercrime. 
2 Background to Cybercrime 
Cybercrime, like traditional crime, can be conceptualised as historically and culturally situated, and 
encapsulated within a social and political ideological framework (Christie, 2004). This creates a chal-
lenge for an efficient definition of cybercrime and also for classification or categorisation of cyber-
crimes. The latter is particularly important as it enables key use cases such as better costing of cyber-
crime to be developed. Syntheses of categorisations proposed by some scholars suggest cybercrimes 
can be understood in three principal ways (Oates, 2001; Wall, 2005; European Union, 2007; Anderson 
et al, 2013). These are (1) traditional crimes that are contingent on the use of technology, (2) publica-
tion of illegal content on the internet, and  (3) crimes that occur within technological forums.  The UK 
Home Office, however, has expressed a preference for opting for a two-fold categorisation: ‘Cyber-
dependent’ and Cyber-enabled’ crimes (McGuire & Dowling, 2013). Here ‘cyber-dependent’ encom-
passes ‘new’ crimes made possible by technology such as malware, hacking, and viruses, while 
‘cyber-enabled’ refers  to ‘old’ crimes such as theft, fraud, and harassment which are committed using 
computers. Gordon and Ford (2006) also propose a two-fold dichotomy, but they suggest that crimes 
are ‘techno-centric’ (Type 1) or ‘people-centric’ (Type-2). The first category is aligned with cyber-
dependent crimes, the latter includes a strong social engineering context. Again there is an element of 
some role being played by technology. Ngafeeson (2010) whilst, acknowledging the role technology 
as an enabler or a dependent variable, proposes that cybercrime also needs to be understood from a 
sociological perspective and so draws upon crime theory to suggest a classification scheme based on 
understanding the motivations of perpetrators. Kshetri (2006) discusses motivation as intrinsic or ex-
trinsic, where the former can have a superior impact to the latter. Others, such as Yar (2006), have 
subdivided cybercrime into areas of harmful activity that illustrate a range of activities and behaviours 
rather than focussing on specific offences. Thus this is an attempt to focus on the impact of a cyber-
crime. 
A common aspect of all these approaches, is that that the classifications present a relatively simple 
form of theory building for explanation – the use of typologies (Doty & Glick, 1994). One effort at 
formalising cybercrime more precisely is that by Stabek et al. (2010) who attempt to define a set-
theoretic view of cyberscams.  
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A further issue is that of the legal viewpoint. As Fafinski et al.  (2010) note: “Cybercrime is not a legal 
term of art”. An implication of this is that prefix of cyber raises legal questions and may even fall out-
side of criminal justice processes such as the case of cyber-rape in Second Life (http://secondlife.com). 
Similarly, the destruction of underwater data cable may or may not be classified as cybercrime. Within 
their discussion, they propose a variant on a three fold typology, based on that by Wall (2005), that 
categorises cybercrime along three dimensions: crimes that are against technology (such as unauthor-
ised access), crimes that use technology (such as fraud), or crimes in the machine that are content re-
lated (such as illegal trading of sexual materials). The latter can be debated at much length, for exam-
ple, content stored on a computer is surely using technology? 
What is clear is that the various classifications focus on different facets of cybercrime and a significant 
shortcoming is that there is no existing classification that presents an integrated view of cybercrime 
that adequately conceptualises cybercrime as involving: “a number of key elements and questions that 
include where the criminal acts exist in the real and digital worlds (and what technologies are involved 
in carrying out the crimes), why are malicious  activities initiated and who is involved in carrying out 
the malicious acts?” (Finklea & Theohary, 2012:2). 
A key question is thus how to present a synthesis of these different classifications in a form that can 
accommodate all these classifications and potentially allow new inferred classifications to emerge as 
the new taxonomy is utilized. Given the dynamic nature of technology and the emergence of new 
forms of cybercrimes, this is crucial. We argue that the global, informational, and distributed nature of 
the internet adds to the complexity of the phenomenon (Wall 2015). The compression of time, space, 
and distance allows not only for easy access to potential targets of cybercrime, but also possibilities of 
large-scale cybercriminal activity. By proposing a taxonomy of cybercrime, this paper contributes to 
the literature to help explore the academic value of this elusive and contested concept. In the remain-
der of the paper, we lay out the foundational technology for a proposal for an integrated taxonomy for 
classifying cybercrimes.  
3 Ontologies and Unified Modeling Language (UML) 
Earlier, we noted that efforts at classifying cybercrimes have largely offered descriptive accounts of 
how a cybercrime might be classified. Little attempt has been made to produce more formal classifica-
tions. In this section, we provide a short description of how core technologies of ontology develop-
ment and UML can be used as foundational form for classifying cybercrime. 
Ontologies are used to capture knowledge about some domain of interest. Ontology describes the con-
cepts in the domain and also the relationships that hold between those concepts.  A widely cited defini-
tion of ontology is that offered by Gruber (1993:199): "An Ontology is an explicit specification of a 
conceptualization." This has been variously refined to include additional characteristics such as ‘for-
mal’ and ‘shared’, where the former is implying machine readability and the latter indicates that the 
conceptualization is an acceptance by a community. Ontologies are content theories about the sorts of 
objects, properties of objects and relations between objects possible in a specified knowledge domain 
(Chandrasekeran et al., 1999) and as such enables the study of  “…the most pervasive features of reali-
ty” (Fettke & Loos, 2003:2945). 
Developing an ontology for a given domain provides several advantages arising from the formal un-
derpinnings, that is, first order logics. There is provision for a well-defined glossary for a domain; re-
al-world semantics; the identification of inappropriate constructs revealing problems in the definition, 
interpretation and/or usage of concepts (through built-in reasoners) and support for evolutionary de-
velopment (and inference) of new knowledge relating to a domain. 
There are several ontology representation languages available. This paper uses the W3C recommenda-
tion ontology language OWL (Web Ontology language) in its version OWL2 to represent the ontology 
(http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/wiki/OWL). An OWL ontology consists of Individuals, Properties and 
Classes. Individuals, represent objects in a given domain. Properties are binary relations on individuals 
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and are used to link two individuals together. Properties can be inverse to allow a link between two 
individuals to be traversed in both directions. OWL classes are interpreted as sets that contain individ-
uals. Classes can be organized into taxonomies of super-class/sub-class hierarchies and are described 
formally using logics. 
The Unified Modelling Language (UML) is an OMG standard used for describing software intensive 
systems using diagrammatic representations (OMG, 2015). This paper uses a subset of UML (the class 
diagram and object diagrams) as a conceptual modeling technology for representing our proposed cy-
bercrime taxonomy. The relationship between UML conceptual models and ontologies has been the 
subject of much research and there several examples that show how the two approaches can be inte-
grated (Wang & Chan, 2001; Paulheim et al., 2011). Based on this, the following mapping between 
the two technologies is shown in Table 1 below. 
 
UML Concept OWL2 DL / Protégé Concepts 
UML Class Class 
UML Attribute ObjectProperty 
UML Association End ObjectProperty 
UML Association ObjectProperty 
 
Table 1 Mapping UML model elements to OWL2 DL 
4 Methodology 
Various methods exist for developing taxonomies and as Nickerson et al. (2013) point out, they also 
tend to be ad hoc. Additionally, most approaches also vary in terms of formality, rigour and evaluation 
(Land et al. 2015). Recent efforts by Nickerson et al. and more latterly, Land et al. have both attempt-
ed to lay out prescribed steps for building a taxonomy that begin from either an inductive approach 
(empirical to conceptual) or a deductive approach (conceptual to empirical). Partly, this division ap-
pears to be explained by discipline dependent viewpoints. Thus they note that: a “typology” (common 
in the social sciences) is drawn from conceptual classification, while a “taxonomy” (widely used in the 
biological sciences) is drawn from empirical classification (Bailey, 1994). Integration between these 
two viewpoints occurs in the latter stage when there is a “working taxonomy” (Figure 2 in Land et al. 
2015).  We also note that both approaches do not specifically comment on the working language or 
format of the taxonomy. This latter point is important if we want to utilize taxonomies through sys-
tems and therefore require that there is a minimum machine manipulatability aspect to the approach. 
Given these limitations of delayed integration of conceptual with empirical evidence and the lack of a 
working language for a taxonomy, we adopt a methodology that incorporates the following features: 
• Closer and earlier integration between deductive and inductive approaches to developing the meta 
features of a taxonomy. 
• Utilisation of established language constructs for specifying the conceptual features of the taxono-
my (based on UML 2.0 standard).  
• A design science approach that is in the spirit of “how to do” proposed by March & Smith (1995) 
that is demonstrated by the use of an ontology published using the XML/OWL language 
(http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/wiki/OWL). 
• Support for open world analysis that allows the taxonomy to act as a reference model that can easi-
ly be extended both in terms of meta concepts and taxonomic instances. 
• Support for machine readability and hence interaction with other systems. 
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The Cybercrime Taxonomy proposed in this paper in section 5 uses the methodological framework 
shown in Figure 1. There are three stages in this process. We describe each stage below. 
 
Figure 1 Taxonomy development method 
Determine Starting Conceptual Model 
As in the methodology originally proposed by Nickerson et al. (2013) and subsequently extended by 
Land et al. (2015), the first step is to identify the meta characteristics required for the objective of the 
taxonomy. These characteristics are derived from both academic literature including victimization sur-
veys, and empirical case studies documented in the public domain such as cybercrimes reported in 
newspapers (CyberRoad 2015). In contrast to prior approaches, we document the meta characteristics 
using a conceptual modeling approach with the language tooling offered by the UML 2.0 standard 
(OMG, 2015). A conceptual model is the first artifact of that activity. We suggest that this adds signif-
icant rigour to other approaches where no such formal language is used. 
Evaluate Model 
This stage is closely linked with the previous one and its main purpose is to refine the initial conceptu-
al model with further case study examples which are used to evaluate the model in terms of the dimen-
sions proposed by Moody (2005) such as completeness and consistency. Evaluation is enacted through 
the development of object models. The benefit of using object models is the possibility of ensuring a 
well-defined semantics. Here, we limit the semantics of this model to be a collection of object models 
that are instances of the semantic model.  The semantic model comprises objects and slots that contain 
values. Additionally, there are well-formed rules that determine how an instance model is deemed to 
be correct with respect to the conceptual model. As new case studies end up being represented by ob-
ject models, new properties, types and relationships are added to the starting conceptual model indi-
cated by the update arrow. 
 
Implement as Ontology 
The updated conceptual model represents a closed world. For a cybercrime taxonomy to deliver the 
benefits outlined in the introduction section, it needs to be constantly updated and evolved to meet the 
needs of multiple stakeholders.  The border-free aspect of cybercrime places demands on the need for 
efforts at standardisation and so a further requirement is a taxonomy that can also act as a reference 
model for the domain of cybercrime. For both these requirements, domain ontologies can be used to 
represent a standardised model of the cybercrime domain (van Heijst et al, 1997). Consequently, this 
step translates the conceptual model developed from the previous stages to an ontology-based repre-
sentation using Protégé. Established mechanisms for translating UML concepts to OWL/Protégé con-
cepts are used (Table 1). The resulting ontology is described in the next section along with an evalua-
tion of the ontology using a number of perceived cyber-crimes. 
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5 A Taxonomy for Cybercrime 
In this section we present our proposal using an ontological basis for describing taxonomy for cyber-
crime by noting two observations from recent research. Firstly, Wand & Weber (2004) note that theo-
ries of ontology sometimes function like taxonomies. Secondly, as noted by Nickerson (2013), a tax-
onomy may be a step toward a future ontology. We will argue that this perceived inter-dependency is 
advantageous in discussions of classifications of cybercrimes as it allows for evolution and debate in 
classifications. 
Following the cyclical nature of the method outlined in the earlier section, we show how the conceptu-
al model (using UML class diagrams) and its translation into OWL2 DL using the open source ontolo-
gy tool Protégé is closely integrated. 
5.1 Cybercrime Conceptual Model 
Using the existing literature, we propose a conceptual model for cybercrime. The model is shown in its 
entirety in Figure 2. We refer to the model in the following discussion. 
As noted earlier, the model concepts were derived from existing efforts to classify cybercrimes. At the 
most abstract level, we are able to state that:  An Agent is motivated by either an Intrinsic desire or an 
Extrinsic need to commit an Action. Actions are perceived as Crimes depending upon a receiver 
Agent’s Viewpoint. If an Action is a Cybercrime (and so subsuming the concept of Crime), then the 
Cybercrime must be mediated through a TechnologyRole. That is, some form of technology must be 
involved to enact a Cybercrime. An Action must have a Target and there must be some type of Impact 
endured by the Target. An Impact is the effect of a crime on a Target and can be Economic, Psycho-
logical or Geo-political. A Crime is an Action that is a TraditionalCrime or a CyberCrime.  
In discussions of traditional crime, criminological explanations are nuanced and range from conceptu-
alizing crime as a ‘rational’ act, to others that locate criminal activity within the paradigms of state 
power and control, social construction, and a product of the constraints of a social and economic envi-
ronment (Stucky & Krohn, 2009). The cybercrime literature is largely under-theorized at present but 
there have been attempts to apply some existing traditional crime theories to crimes committed in cy-
berspace (Yar, 2005; Li, Zhang & Sarathy, 2010). Such theories discuss the conditions such as ‘oppor-
tunity’, ‘availability of potential target/technology’, ‘absence of legal guardians’, and ‘potential gain’ 
as a motivator to cybercrime. Notably, motivation as the driving force behind cybercrime has become 
the key focus. Some of the earliest efforts to explain motivations for cybercrime originated in the work 
of Furnell (2001) and naturally builds on criminological literature. Hence, the Motivation model ele-
ment exists to account for both Furnell’s explanations of motivations and those proposed by Nga-
feeson (2010). Cybercrimes including defrauding, theft, piracy, hacking, and viruses may be concep-
tualized within the motivation paradigm. Such motivation maybe intrinsic or extrinsic within a moral, 
ideological, psychological and financial framework. Elements of power and control can be seen as 
inherent within such motivations. Additionally, the Agents, the Targets, and the victims of cybercrime 
may be Individuals, Organisations or States who operate within such motivational arenas. Targets can 
also be TargetTechnology to account for Cybercrimes committed against the computer (Wall, 2005). 
The taxonomy allows for crimes to be described as a crime (or cybercrime) or just a normative action 
through the use of a Viewpoint construct. Viewpoints are possessed by Observers of Actions. Many of 
the existing efforts to either construct taxonomies for cybercrime or to classify cybercrimes refer to the 
centrality of the role played by technology. A frequently cited effort at classification is that by Gordon 
& Ford (2006). Others include classifications by Wall (2005), Jahankhani et al. (2014) and Yar (2006). 
The latter introduced state actors as both initiators and targets of cybercrime. As mentioned above, 
much of the role of technology in cybercrime has now been synthesized and is perhaps most succinctly 
captured by a UK Home Office report that described two broad categories of cybercrime: cyber-
dependent crimes and cyber-enabled crimes (McGuire & Dowling, 2013). In our conceptual model, 
The TechnologyRole concept has two (disjoint) subtypes: Enabled and Contingent that describes this 
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classification. One feature of cybercrime is the frequency of contact and the use of non-physical loca-
tions (i.e. cyberspace) where that contact occurs (Gordon & Ford, 2006). This concept and its relation-
ship constraint is presented in the conceptual model. 
 
 
Figure 2 Cybercrime conceptual model 
 
Within the model there are several class hierarchies that are of interest. An Agent can be disjoint with 
IndividualAgent, StateAgent or OrganisationAgent representing different levels of Agent engagement 
committing some Action. A Target has a similar subtyping hierarchy: TargetIndividual, State, Organi-
sation and TargetTechnology (to account for infrastructure).  
While the Mcguire & Dowling (2013) classification offers a straight-forward bifurcation of cyber-
crime, there are further subtleties to categorise. Hence we introduce a further subtyping (based on 
Gordon & Ford) of Contingent to include the notion of Crimeware (software used in the commission 
of a criminal act whose use is not involuntary) as opposed to TechnologyPlatform that is merely a plat-
form whose contingency enables a crime. For example, a security flaw in a Web Browser is not crime-
ware, but the flaw makes possible for a cybercrime to be committed. Similarly, TechnologyPlatform 
also allows for the use of technology to be container for content (akin, to Wall’s “Crime in the Ma-
chine”). A further consideration is the role of social engineering acts to manipulate targets to enable a 
Cybercrime. We account for this by the employs association relationship between TechnologyRole and 
SocialEngineeringAct. 
5.2 Constraints 
A conceptual model that offers only a visual representation of cybercrime is not sufficient, as there a 
number of constraints that are not immediately clear to the interested reader. We offer some sample 
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constraints using the OMG standard Object Constraint Language (Warmer & Kleppe, 2003) to illus-
trate this need and hence the benefits of moving to an ontological foundations for a taxonomy. 
5.2.1 Abstract Classes 
We propose that some classes are abstract. That is, there are no instances of that class. Such classes 
include: TechnologyRole, Motivation, Location, Target, Impact, and Agent. 
We illustrate this constraint for TechnologyRole and Agent as: 
TechnologyRole 
TechnologyRole.allInstances->Select(oclType=TechnologyRole)isEmpty 
/* The set of all instances of TechnologyRole is empty */ 
 
Agent 
Agent.allInstances->Select(oclType=Agent)isEmpty 
/* The set of all instances of Agent is empty */ 
5.2.2 Loop Invariants 
In many conceptual models, there is a requirement to ensure that navigation of associations results in 
returning to the instance of a class from which the navigation was initiated.  In the model on Figure 2, 
there is one such invariant. 
We want to assert that the target of a crime results in an impact to the target. That is, when a crime is 
committed against a target, there is an impact of the crime on that target. We express the constraint as 
follows: 
 
Target 
self.action.impact.target=self 
5.2.3 Perceptions of Crime 
An external observer may have a perception that an action is a crime or may simple be an action in the 
most general sense. We account for this by adding constraints on the association relationship between 
Viewpoint subclass hierarchy and Action.  
CrimeView 
self.action->forAll(oclIsKindOf(Crime)) 
Action View 
self.action->forAll(oclIsKindOf(Action)) 
5.2.4 Cybercrime 
OCL constraints allows us to be more precise about what is a cybercrime. We assert that a cybercrime 
is mediated by a TechnologyRole and targets either Individuals, States, Organisations or TargetTech-
nology and all the Contact arising from the crime is made in Cyberspace. This is expressed as a con-
straint in the following manner: 
Cybercrime 
self.technologyrole->notEmpty ∧ self.contact->forAll(c:Contact | 
(c.cyberspace->notEmpty)) 
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5.3 Ontological Representation of Cybercrime 
There are several advantages in using ontologies to represent theories based on taxonomic structures. 
Ontologies offer parsimony of concepts, are easily extendable, can be explanatory and more im-
portantly can present hidden inferences because of the formal underpinnings. In this section we pre-
sent two aspects of the ontology, the taxonomic (hierarchical class structures) and the relationships 
between classes.  through an implementation of bi-directional OWL object properties. The taxonomic 
structure is a straightforward translation into OWL classes and is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 Taxonomy class structures in OWL/Protégé  
Experience from ontology engineering shows that inverse relationships should be included in an on-
tology in order to fully specify concept relationships (Lantow & Sandkuhl, 2015). The association re-
lationships are implemented as bi-directional OWL properties and the details are shown in Table 2 and 
Figure 4 below. 
 
Domain Object Property name / Inverse Restriction Range 
Action against / 
subjectedAction 
Some / 
Min 1 
Target 
Impact causedBy /  
hasImpactOf 
Some / 
Min 1 
Action 
Social Engi-
neering Act 
employedBy /  
employsSocialEngineering 
Some / 
Min 1 
TechnologyRole 
Location For /  
happensAt 
Some / 
Min 1 
Action 
Motivation forCommitting /  
motivatedBy 
Min 1 / 
Some 
Action 
Motivation motivationFor /  Some /  Agent 
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isMotivatedBy Min 1 
Impact On /  
recipientOf 
Min 1 /  
Min 1 
Target 
Viewpoint perceivedBy / 
perceives 
Some /  
Exactly 1 
External Observer 
Viewpoint perceptionOf / 
perceivedFrom 
Exactly 1 / 
Some 
Action 
Cybercrime isMediatedBy / 
mediates 
Min 1 / 
Some 
TechnologyRole 
Contact usedBy / 
makes 
Some / 
Min 2 
Cybercrime 
Contact contactIn / 
locationFor 
Min 1 / 
Min 1 
Cyberspace 
 
Table 2 Conceptual relationships documented in OWL 
To illustrate how this works, the following diagram shows a model snippet of an associations between 
classes and the equivalent highlighted OWL object properties. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Model snippet of association relationships and their implementation in OWL/Protégé  
6 Evaluation 
We outline two initial evaluations of our model for cybercrime. First, we use the formal ontology doc-
umented using OWL/Protégé to describe two examples of well known cybercrimes: the Nigerian 419 
scam used as an exemplar by Stabek et al. (2009) and the more recent CryptoLocker malware exam-
ple. Second, we use the UML conceptual model to explore the Snowden revelations of 2013 (Landau, 
2013) to illustrate social constructions of crime dependent upon an external observer’s viewpoint. 
6.1 Nigerian 419 Scam and CryptoLocker 
The Nigerian scam is described by Land et al. (2015:6) as: “an unsolicited email (or fax or any other 
methods of delivery via the internet) detailing an unfortunate story of the sender (i.e. scammer) and 
(s)he has a fortune, but (s)he needs the victim to supply an overseas bank account to transfer the mon-
ey or request a small amount of money for a short term. In return for the victim’s assistance, the 
scammer promises to share some of the fortune with the victim, say 10% for the total amount of 
wealth”.    
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The Cryptolocker malware is software that encrypts various files on the user's computer and demands 
the owner to pay the malware authors in order to decrypt the files (Mustaca, 2014). 
For both these well-known examples, we use the taxonomy structure in the ontology model in Protégé 
and the supporting conceptual model together to classify and store classifications of cybercrimes. To 
do so, the ontology designer can ask the following series of questions and create instances (OWL In-
dividuals) of the appropriate class. Table 3 illustrates the questions and instances created for both ex-
amples of cybercrime. 
 
Method Question Nigerian 419 CryptoLocker 
What is the type of Agent? Individual/Organisation Individual/Organisation 
What is the Motivation for committing the action Financial Gain Financial Gain 
What is the perceived nature of the action? Is it a crime?  Crime Crime 
Is it mediated by Technology? Yes Yes 
What role is technology playing? Technology Platform Software 
Is social engineering employed Social Engineering Act Social Engineering Act 
How is contact being made via Cyberspace Email Email 
What is the type of Target  Individual Individual 
What is the Impact Economic / Psycholog-
ical  
Economic / Psycholog-
ical 
3 Methods for differentiating between cybercrimes 
 
Table 3 provides a summary of the key concepts. However, the documentation of the cybercrime in 
the Protégé toolset can show much more detail, including, critically, the relationships between object 
instances. Figure 5 shows a cybercrime instance – Nigerian-419-scam and its relationships to other 
objects.  
More examples of cybercrimes classified by a very prelimary version of this taxonomy is published in 
a technical report available from the EU Seventh Framework Programme CyberRoad project (Cyber-
road, 2015). 
6.2 Snowden Revelations 2013 
In June 2013, the Guardian Newspaper in the UK began publishing a series of exposés on bulk data 
collection conducted by the US National Security Agency. This information was obtained from a 
cache of classified data obtained illegally by Edward Snowden who was working as a contractor for 
Booz Allen Hamilton at the NSA headquarters. Information revealed included several programmes of 
work that targeted Internet Communications and stored data of “non-US persons”. Other leaks includ-
ed details of the US government spying on Chinese computers and reports that Britain was also con-
ducting massive intercepts of domestic communications (Landau, 2013).  
Here, we are not debating the ethical concerns of the actions of Snowden, instead, we wish to show 
two hypothetical models of interpretation of Snowden’s actions using our taxonomic model. The dia-
gram below illustrates the two perspectives. In the upper part of Figure 6, Snowden is an Individual 
Agent who is motivated by a Moral concern that presents a reason for his Action.  A ‘privacy organi-
sation’ (External Observer) views Snowden’s Action as not a crime hence there are no further instanc-
es of the model. 
The lower diagram in Figure 6 shows a more complete object model, where the external observer such 
as a security organisation perceives the Action as a crime and as the crime is contingent on technolo-
gy, has impacts on the target (state) that are geo-political and (some) contact was made in cyberspace, 
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the crime is an example of a cybercime. We can use the invariant presented in 5.14 to check the valid 
semantics of both these two object model snippets. The invariant fails for the moral crusader model 
but holds for the cyber-criminal model. 
 
 
Figure 5 Nigerian 419 scam in OWL/Protégé   
How does this taxonomy compare with other established models of cybercrime? The widely cited ty-
pology for cybercrime by Gordon & Ford (2006) would classify the Nigerian 419 Scam as a Type II 
cybercrime in that it is facilitated by programmes that are not seen as crimeware and there are repeated 
contacts with the target user (Gordon & Ford, 2006:16). CryptoLocker on the other would be seen as 
Type I cybercrime as it has been facilitated by the introduction of crimeware programmes. The Snow-
den example however, would not be classified as a cybercrime. The Gordon & Ford classification does 
not allow us to see the wider context of the motivation of the perpetrator, nor the nature of the impact 
on the target. It also does not allow us to consider sociological aspects of the crime with respect to the 
perspective from which the cybercrime is being classified. These additional details, we contend, are 
beneficial if we are to develop more effective models for costing cybercrime or for developing appro-
priate policies and education around cybercrime. 
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Figure 6 Object model snippets for Snowden example 
 
6.3 Validity Concerns 
The production of IT artifacts in design science raise concerns of instantiation validity that are ana-
lagous to the concepts of construct validity in survey research (Straub et al., 2004, Lukyanenko, 2014). 
However, there are further challenges. Firstly, realistic IT artifacts are more complex and expensive to 
build, secondly the artifacts occupy a large design/instantiation space. For example, there may be mul-
tiple ways to code a particular algorithm. Further, emergent properties may arise that are difficult to 
predict. Both the UML model and its ontology representation are examples of a mid-range theory, that 
is, they are moderately abstract (i.e., they do not purport to explain everything) but are “close enough 
to observed data to be incorporated in propositions that permit empirical testing” (Merton, 1949). We 
have illustrated the validity of these models but full exploration of the design space requires further 
empirical evidence by independent scholars. To this end, we have published the ontology for further 
scrutiny at http://goo.gl/uKmYL1. 
7 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have examined existing definitions of cybercrime and like Gordon & Ford (2006), we  
conclude that there is a lack of clarity of common usage and classification of cybercrime. This paper 
addresses this concern by advancing a new taxonomy of cybercrime that has semi-formal rigour in that 
the taxonomy is based on a set of concepts described through the use of a UML model and accompa-
nying wellformedness rules. To account for the open world nature of cybercrime, that is, we cannot 
foresee future types of cybercrimes, we have proposed an ontology for cybercrime that has been im-
plemented in OWL/Protégé and has been made publicly available through the Web Protégé environ-
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ment. This ontology is open to extension, both in terms of new concepts and new examples of cyber-
crime. 
Our taxonomy is a first step in developing both a well-formed taxonomy and the surrounding context 
of a cybercrime classification that will result in better understanding to enable the development of 
more effective models for costing cybercrime. Our future work will include developing new axioms to 
support reasoning about cybercrime in order to ask specific questions such as cost, and efficacy of 
training to address specific cybercrime concerns. 
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